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Aftershock: Housing in the Wake of the Mortgage Meltdown

A special study incorporating Case-Shiller® Home Price Indexes

SUMMARY

Aftershock: Housing in the Wake of the Mortgage Meltdown analyzes the house-price outlook for the nation and the nation's 381 metropolitan areas using Fiserv Lending Solutions' Case-Shiller Home Price Indexes—widely regarded as the most accurate measure of house price appreciation available.

Key questions addressed in this special study include:

  • What is the outlook for national, regional and metro house prices?
  • When will housing markets hit bottom and what will the shape of their recoveries look like?
  • What are the key weights on housing markets? How and why do they differ by region?
  • Which regions are likely to suffer more severe and/or protracted house price declines?
  • What are the spillover effects of declining house prices on the broader economy?
  • Can policymakers mitigate the severity of the coming house price declines?

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Subject to change

Chapter 1: Executive Summary

Forecast summary

Awash in inventory

Subprime financial shock

Where's the bottom?

Financial threat

Circumspect consumers

Engaged policymakers

Conclusions

Chapter 2: An Historical Assessment

The boom

The bust

Chapter 3: Explaining History

Behind the boom

Behind the bust

Chapter 4: House-Price Primer

Chapter 5: Measuring House-Price Risk

Income-to-price

Price-to-rent

User cost-to-rent

Chapter 6: Leading House Price Indicator

Specification

Estimation

Validation

LHPI's outlook

Chapter 7: Structural Econometric Model

Theory

Historical data

Equilibrium equation

Adjustment equation

Validation

Alternative specifications

Valuation

Chapter 8: Forecast Accuracy

National accuracy

Regional accuracy

U.S. regional forecast consistency

Chapter 9: House-Price Outlook

House-price declines

House-price recovery

Chapter 10:MSAs

Chapter 11: Risks to the Outlook

Baseline assumptions

Negative risks

Positive risks

Chapter 12: Conclusions

Appendices

About Moody's Economy.com

Excerpts from Executive Summary

Forecast Summary

The current housing recession is expected to run through early 2009 and will ultimately be severe enough to be characterized as a housing crash. Home sales are exptedted to hit bottom in early 2008, declining by over 40% from their peak, housing starts will reach their nadir in mid-2008, falling by 55%, and house prices are expected to decline by 12% through early 2009. After accounting for the plethora of non-price discounts home sellers are offering to buyers, effective house-price declines peak to trough will total well over 15%.

Awash in Inventory

The housing market’s most fundamental problem is it is awash in unsold inventory. According to the Census Bureau, as of the third quarter of 2007 there was close to 2.1 million vacant unsold homes that were for sale, equal to 2.6% of the stock of owner-occupied homes. Even a well-functioning housing market has a substantial amount of inventory. But in the quarter-century between the early 1980s and mid-2000s, the vacancy rate was an unwavering near 1.7%. The difference between the current over 2.6% vacancy rate and the 1.7% rate that consistently prevailed prior to the recent boom provides a good estimate of the amount of excess inventory in the market—it currently totals nearly 750,000 homes (see Chart 1-4). This is far and away the highest level of excess inventory in the post-World War II period. 2

Subprime Financial Shock

Subprime financial shock. Inventories of unsold homes will rise substantially further in coming quarters as the ongoing subprime financial shock results in a collapse in home sales and surging mortgage loan defaults and foreclosures. The global financial turmoil ignited this past summer by the rising credit problems on U.S. residential mortgage loans has significantly disrupted the flows of credit into the mortgage market. The issuance of bonds backed by subprime, Alt-A, and jumbo loans has fallen dramatically in recent months. At the peak of activity between 2005 through the first half of 2007, issuance of these bonds totaled close to $1 trillion annualized. During the third quarter—the shock began in late July and August—issuance plummeted to only $300 billion (see Chart 1-5). 5 So far in the fourth quarter, issuance has not measurably revived.

Where's the Bottom

Where’s the bottom? The outlook for the housing market thus appears very daunting. The mountain of housing inventory will only clear sufficiently for the market to find a bottom if homebuilders significantly further curtail construction, and thus new supply, and for home sellers to slash their prices to restore affordability and stimulate housing demand. To gauge just how much lower construction and house prices must decline for this to occur, the Moody’s Economy.com macroeconometric model of the U.S. economy was simulated under a number of different assumptions. Under the baseline (most likely) set of assumptions, the economy avoids recession but experiences slow job growth, the entire Treasury yield curve remains well below 5%, and loan modification efforts soon gain momentum. In this scenario, the housing market finds a bottom by early 2009 with average annual housing starts of approximately one million units over the entire period and a peak-to-trough decline in national house prices of 12% (see Chart 1-12). Housing starts in September were running at a 1.2 million unit pace and house prices are down 5% so far.

Financial Threat

Financial threat. The risks to this disconcerting near-term housing outlook seem skewed decidedly to the downside. Of most concern is that sliding house prices and eroding mortgage quality will reignite another wave of global financial turmoil. The ramifications of this for the economy, and thus housing, would be overwhelming. Behind this worry is the financial system’s substantial exposure to hundreds of billions in mortgage losses that are set to come. While financial institutions have begun to recognize these losses, as is evident from the recent string of billion dollar writedowns, they have fallen well-short of what they ultimately will have to realize.

Circumspect Consumers

Another negative risk to the outlook is posed by the intensifying negative housing wealth effects resulting from the severe and persistent decline in house prices and homeowners’ equity. As consumers turn more cautious in response to their eroding wealth, the economic expansion will surely waver, but if it falters significantly it will ignite a further devolution of the already reeling housing market. The wealth effect postulates that changes in household wealth measurably impact household spending. If household wealth is rising (falling), then households will spend more (less) out of their current income, and thus save less (more). The idea behind the wealth effect is simply that as households become wealthier they do not need to save as much today to be prepared for their future financial needs. It is no longer as necessary to save for such things as their children’s college education or their own retirement.

Engaged Policymakers

The most significant upside risk to the housing outlook is that policymakers appear fully engaged in stanching the financial turmoil and ensuring that the economy avoids recession. The Federal Reserve has aggressively lowered interest rates in recent weeks and Congress and the administration are working to aid the hard-pressed mortgage market. More help will be needed, but policymakers appear ready to provide whatever is necessary.

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